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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (17 Jul 70) FOR OT UT 702211

29 July 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Camp Red Devil
APO San Francisco 96477

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21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

a. Mission.

1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) (Inclosure 1, Task Organization) in cooperation and coordination with ARVN and CVN Territorial and Regional Forces conducts search and clear, reconnaissance in force, rocket suppression and pacification operations within assigned area of operation.

b. Operations.

The following major operations were conducted by 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) during the period 1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970.

(1) Operation Greene River (19 Jan 1970 - present)

(a) General.

Operation Greene River began on 19 January 1970 and continued throughout the remainder of the reporting period. The mission of the brigade was to continue search and clear, reconnaissance in force and ambush operations in the assigned AO and to intensify preparations for the approaching high threat period. The brigade increased its intelligence effort and its reconnaissance and surveillance of known and suspected enemy base areas. Efforts were also directed toward strengthening FSB's and strong points to include prepositioning of supplies and equipment. In addition, brigade units increased the security of key installations, airfields, and key bridges. Initially the brigade AO

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AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(Inclosure 1) was realigned to insure optimum coverage throughout the area during the high threat period of TET. (Inclosure 2)

The major operational tasks performed by units of the 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) were:

1. 1-11 Infantry: The battalion conducted search and clear and night ambush operations in AO Green, secured FSB Fuller with one rifle company, and maintained one company as a brigade ready reaction force at QTCB.

2. TF 1-61: The primary missions performed by TF 1-61 were to provide security at A4 and C2, conduct search and clear and reconnaissance in force operations in AO Orange, and conduct combined operations west of AO Orange with elements of the 2nd ARVN Regiment and to the east with the 7th ARVN Mech.

3. TF 1-77: Security of the Cua Viet Naval Facility and the conduct of day patrols and night ambushes in northern AO Black were the primary missions assigned to TF 1-77 under Operation Greene River. In April 1970 TF 1-77 began conducting search and clear and reconnaissance in force operations in AO Blue, secured an artillery element vic FSB Pedro, and established NDP's in AO Blue.

4. TF 3-5: This unit conducted a number of operations within and adjacent to AO White. These included reconnaissance in force and search and clear operations in AO White and the Mai Loc CIDG AO, provided security for land clearing operations by the 59th Land Clearing Company, and establishment of a ready reaction force for Mai Loc, Huong Hoa District, and Camp Carroll. In addition TF 3-5 provided security for an artillery raid near the "Rockpile" (XD 9855) and conducted combined operations with the 2d ARVN Regiment.

(b) Significant Contacts:

1. During an operation to the west of AO Orange from 30 Mar - 06 Apr 1970, TF 1-61 initiated contact with various sized NVA and VC elements. The operation resulted in 58 NVA KIA.

2. On 06 April 1970, two platoons of 3-5 Cav were attacked in their NDP's in AO White. The successful defense of their positions resulted in 49 NVA KIA and two PW's.

3. On 08 April 1970 a platoon of A/4-12 Cav occupying a night ambush in AO Black was attacked by an unknown size enemy force, resulting in nine NVA/VC KIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) The cumulative results to date of Operation Greene River are:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>				<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA (E)</u>	<u>WIA (M)</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
22	330	71	1	237	3	61	15

(2) Combined Operations.

The brigade initiated integrated operations of brigade units and local forces in two districts of the province to enhance security of the populated areas, coordinate the operation of all forces charged with some aspect of population security, and simultaneously upgrade and train RF/PF units in the area.

For each operation a combined operations center was established for the district chief and the commanding officer of the controlling battalion headquarters. All plans, concepts, and decisions were developed at the combined operations center. The DIOCC and TOC were operational 24 hours a day and principal members of the battalion staff and their Vietnamese counterparts met for planning and coordination on a daily basis. U.S. commanders and small unit leaders were thoroughly briefed as to the purpose, intent, and mission of the operation. U.S. troops were indoctrinated during a preparation stage of the operation. As a minimum, basic combat fundamentals were reviewed and the use of interpreters and Vietnamese customs and traditions were taught to the brigade soldiers.

During the operation, U.S. and RF company commanders and platoon leaders conducted initial joint briefings. Directions and orders were agreed on at District/Task Force level, then simultaneously were sent to the combined US/RF company headquarters. The two company commanders agreed on the implementing orders which were dispatched to each combined RF/US platoon headquarters. The platoons jointly selected combined squad ambush positions and the location of claymore ambushes. Tactical reports were sent from the RF/US company headquarters to the combined operations center where the District Chief and U.S. Task Force Commander received them and jointly developed further instructions.

(a) Operation York Market (30 Jan - 16 April 1970)

Operation York Market was a combined reconnaissance in force, search and clear, security, rice denial, and saturation ambush patrolling operation by integrated US/RF infantry companies. The 1st

INCL

3

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AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Battalion, 77th Armor was designated the controlling headquarters for the combined operation southwest of Hai Truong (Inclosure 4) in Hai Lang District. For the operation, a U.S. infantry company was combined at platoon level with an RF company following a joint training period. The combined/integrated force conducted operations to the southwest of Hai Truong while to the east three Combined Action Platoons in conjunction with a PF platoon, the Revolutionary Development Cadre, People's Self Defense Forces, and the RF bridge security force provided local security for the populace and assisted in the administration of MEDCAP, Psyop, and civic action projects. During the period the villages went from a HES D rating to a C rating.

During the period, five RF companies were upgraded. The cumulative results were:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>				
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
US	0	8	0	20	1	2	20
RF	0	1	0				1

(b) Operation Dakota Clint (10 Feb - 29 Mar 1970)

Operation Dakota Clint was a combined reconnaissance in force, search and clear, security, rice denial, and saturation ambush/patrolling operation by integrated US/RF infantry companies and recon/killer teams. The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry was designated the controlling headquarters for the combined operation in the Mai Loc AO (Inclosure 5). Security forces consisted of one U.S. infantry company, two RF companies, eight PF platoons, and the CIDG forces. The U.S. infantry company and the RF/PF units (one company at a time) were combined at platoon level and conducted search and clear, security, and night ambush operations in now populated areas of Mai Loc AO. Extensive MEDCAP, Psyop and civic action activities were concurrently conducted during the operation. Five RF companies were upgraded during the operation. The results of TF 1-11 Inf's participation in Operation Dakota Clint were:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>				
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>CHIEU HOI</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
US	0	15	0	19	1	0	4
Local 2		15	0				0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

c. Significant Activities.

(1) Issue of M551, Sheridan Assault Vehicle.

During the reporting period, all armored cavalry units under operational control of the brigade were issued the M551 as a replacement for the M48A3, medium tank. Each troop of the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry and A Troop, 4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry completed a one week training exercise including live firing exercises on the brigade range prior to conducting operations with the new vehicle. The program was scheduled over a six week period and by early March, all units had completed their familiarization training and were conducting daily operations with the M551.

(2) RF/PF Leadership School.

The RF/PF leadership school established by the brigade in December 1969, continued to train selected RF/PF squad and platoon leaders in leadership and small unit tactics. During the reporting period 279 students successfully completed the course of instruction.

(3) Civic Action/Psyop.

(a) General:

During the reporting period, brigade civic action operations were directed towards the support of pacification programs at hamlet and village level. These operations were coupled with the two major pacification operations discussed earlier.

During TET 1970, the brigade assumed a supporting role of local Vietnamese projects. The brigade provided 4,500 gifts and 380 pounds of candy for a program developed by the S-5 of the 2d ARVN Regiment. The program was a series of 2d ARVN Regiment sponsored parties for children of the province. In addition to normal district activities, battalion S-5's jointly planned TET programs with their respective district chiefs. Though enough gifts, food and candy were provided for 5,200 children in five districts, U.S. unit participation was purposely minimal.

(b) MEDCAP

1. Observation.

After reevaluating the medical system established in Quang Tri Province and the support offered to this system by military medical civic action teams, the brigade readjusted its goals and procedures

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

for MEDCAP operations. The greatest need for assistance was found to be at the village dispensaries. The province medicine chief provided a list by district of the village dispensaries which would benefit by the scheduled visit of a medical doctor. The Brigade Surgeon then coordinated the visits of doctors to designated village dispensaries. The mission of the doctor was not to treat patients but to advise and train the responsible nurse and midwife or health worker of a particular village. To insure complete understanding of the program and to formalize the coordination procedures, a joint directive was published under the signature of the Province Chief and the Brigade Commanding General.

2. Evaluation.

The effectiveness of this program can not be measured in immediate results. But the recognition of combined goals on the part of the province and the brigade, which go beyond good will and intelligence information in MEDCAP operations, is an initial indication of its importance. The program is a mutually planned, combined, long range effort to improve the GVN medical workers, create an effective GVN medical supply system, improve dispensary operations and develop confidence in the people towards their health system.

3. Recommendations.

Previous to the initiation of this program, the medical civic action program was a responsibility of the S-5 officer. When the objective of the program was simply promoting good will, the S-5 officer was properly chosen to supervise the effort. But when the objectives of MEDCAP operations were changed to the training of medical workers and technical improvement of the GVN medical system, it became evident that MEDCAP operations must come under the supervision of medical personnel who are trained and technically qualified to implement a program of this scope.

(c) Psyop

1. A joint plan for intensifying the pacification effort in a selected area was executed in two separate though integrally connected operations. The first of these was the provision for total security with the combined tactical resources of the brigade and the province. The second was the inculcation of the desire for self-government and self-development in the people of the selected area. Vietnamese Information Service with U.S. Psyop teams, district and village nurses with U.S. medical personnel, Revolutionary Development Cadre with U.S. civic action teams, all jointly planned and conducted their endeavors to instill in the people an allegiance and then an active participation in the government of Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), For Period Ending April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Psychological operations were conducted with the dual purpose of providing information on GVN, province and district programs and policies as well as strengthening the district and village information cadre. Consistent U.S. interest throughout the operation furthered the appointment of the necessary village and hamlet information cadre. Materials for hamlet information boards were turned over to the district VIS chief for his distribution and the supervision of the construction. Psychological operations were conducted jointly by Detachment 2, 7th Psyop Battalion and the Vietnamese Information C're. As many different techniques of information dissemination were utilized as possible: loudspeaker broadcasts from the air and the ground, motion pictures using both propaganda and entertainment films, province cultural drama teams, and serial and individual distribution of handbills, posters and newspapers.

2. Evaluation. This combined intensified pacification operation achieved its major goal when the hamlet evaluation system rating reflected that the eight hamlets protected by the U.S. infantry and territorial forces were upgraded from contested "D" to "C" rated hamlets. This occurred within forty days after the combined operations were initiated. Significant progress was also made in developing an effective Vietnamese information service, upgrading the health standards, revitalizing the Chieu Hoi program and completion of self-development projects.

3. Recommendations.

The objectives of the brigade combined operations have been successfully reached without the introduction of tactical troops into populated areas. By insuring that a pacification effort is jointly planned and implemented, a tactical unit commander can avoid placing American soldiers in a village. By stressing the proper deployment of regional forces outside of populated areas, the commander can provide the necessary training that will give the RF unit confidence and permit them to operate from village bases and thus provide the security that is necessary to stop infiltration and deny the enemy close-in bases.

2. (C) Section II - Lessons Learned, Commanders Observations, Evaluations,
 - a. Personnel. None
 - b. Intelligence.

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) Mine ambushes.

(a) Observation.

The enemy forces within NICTZ resorted to a new tactic in an attempt to ambush armored columns. On two separate occasions during the reporting period, elements of the 1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech) were confronted by a series of command detonated mines.

(b) Evaluation.

The mines were implanted on main tank trails and ridgelines where armored columns were required to move due to the restrictions imposed by the surrounding terrain. The enemy used both metallic and plastic-satchel charge type mines. The non-metallic or concussion mines were arranged in the center of the tank trail in an attempt to place the detonation point under the center of the vehicle. The metallic or fragmentary mines were emplaced to the sides of the trail to achieve maximum casualties by spraying the sides and tops of the vehicles with fragments. The mines were electrically command detonated. A diagram of such an ambush encountered is attached (Inclosure 6).

(c) Recommendations. None

(2) Enemy clothing.

(a) Observation.

It has been found that after contacts which result in enemy KIA's, soldiers policing the battlefield often overlook items of clothing which contain useful information.

(b) Evaluation.

Unit identifications, names, and other pertinent information are often sewn into clothing where they cannot be readily seen (i.e. under pocket flaps or behind seams). Soldiers should be alerted to look for such markings and evacuate marked clothing with other items and documents.

(c) Recommendation.

The necessity of carefully examining clothing should be emphasized in the continuous training given to troops in the field and in the orientation given replacements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(3) Sensor Devices.

(a) Observation. The enemy will habitually return to an area in which recent allied operations have been conducted.

(b) Evaluation.

Units of the brigade, on request, will have sensor teams attached. These teams emplace sensor devices in areas to be vacated by friendly units; specifically key terrain features, trails, and night defensive positions.

(c) Recommendation.

That sensor devices be used to the maximum extent by units departing an area of operation to detect enemy movement in the area once the friendly forces have departed.

c. Operations.

(1) Combined Security/Pacification Operation.

(a) Observation.

During the period the brigade conducted two combined operations with local forces which were discussed earlier in the report.

(b) Evaluation.

The success of both operations was beyond all expectations. The operations increased the province's RF/PF units capabilities to conduct independent operations, instilled confidence and provided increased motivation for each local force soldier.

(c) Recommendations.

1. For optimum results, a period of two weeks should be set aside for conducting training and operation for the average strength RF company.

2. It is strongly recommended that the Vietnamese supply system be stocked with prepackaged Class I and V to assist in support of combined operations and to be able to support the newly trained RF companies which operate independently.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

21 May 1970

3. A preparation stage should be scheduled for US units prior to initiation of combined US/RF operations. The preparation stage should include refresher training on basic soldiering and orientation on the purpose of the operation, and the techniques of training and operating with Vietnamese counterparts.

4. All decisions on operations from the lowest maneuver element up through the staff should be mutually agreed upon.

5. Command and control headquarters should be collocated for the duration of the operation.

(2) Use of illumination during and after night contact.

(a) Observation.

Continuous illumination prevents the enemy's thorough policing of the battlefield during and after contact.

(b) Evaluation.

During enemy attacks, especially sapper attacks, constant illumination is absolutely necessary; it is equally imperative that illumination be maintained after attacks to prevent the enemy from retrieving valuable equipment as well as their dead and wounded. Artillery illumination is the most readily available and most dependable in any given situation since it requires very little of the commander's time for adjustment during the critical phases of the contact and does not interfere with other artillery fires. Flareships may be used only when weather permits and then only for short periods of time. As a general rule, flareships require too much time from the commander and FO for adjustment and their use restricts the employment of artillery fire.

(c) Recommendation: None

(3) Location of sleeping trenches in night defensive positions.

(a) Observation.

It has been found that most casualties are sustained in the first three to five minutes of a surprise ground attack of a night defensive position.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AJBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Evaluation.

The enemy normally initiates the attack with a heavy volume of rocket, mortar, and RPG fire. Personnel sleeping alongside vehicles, even though their sleeping positions are dug in, are vulnerable to wounds resulting from RPG's impacting on adjacent vehicles.

(c) Recommendation.

Sleeping positions should be prepared with overhead cover (behind or under vehicles in the NDP) to prevent casualties sustained from RPG spalling and to protect personnel against rocket and mortar fragments.

(4) Emergency aircraft navigation.

(a) Observation.

During periods of reduced visibility helicopter missions of an emergency nature can be flown using artillery illumination fire as a navigation guide.

(b) Evaluation.

The brigade DS artillery battalion supported a night extraction of a ranger team during a period of heavy fog. This was accomplished by leading the aircraft with illumination fired at grids along the flight path into the area. When this method is used, direct communication between the firing unit and the aircraft must be used.

(c) Recommendation.

That the use of illumination for aircraft navigation during poor weather conditions be employed for emergency type missions.

(5) Claymore mechanical ambush.

(a) Observation.

The claymore mechanical ambush was employed by several units within the brigade AO when operating away from populated areas. This technique effectively supplemented the manned ambush and when employed consecutively within an area increased the overall threat to enemy forces and significantly reduced the enemy traffic within an area. A large percentage of the enemy casualties inflicted during the period can be credited to the use of the claymore mechanical ambush.

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
AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(b) Evaluation.

The claymore mechanical type ambush may be employed in numerous configurations; limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of the personnel employing them. Recon/Killer teams and infantry companies of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry have employed linear, circular, L - shaped, T - shaped and V - shaped configurations of the claymore ambush. As many as eighteen M-18A1 claymore mines have been employed in a single "kill zone". A typical claymore ambush has these components:



The wooden wedge between the contacts of the jaws of the clothespin is the only break in a circuit connecting a cap and a power source. Removal of the wedge completes the circuit and detonates the mines.

(c) Recommendations.

The generous use of the claymore mechanical ambush is recommended as a means of increasing the threat to the enemy and increasing a unit's influence over a particular area. However, it should not be used in close proximity to populated areas or those areas where there is innocent civilian traffic.

d. Organizations: None

e. Training.

(1) Imagery Interpreter Training.

(a) Observation.

The 517th MID Imagery Interpretation (II) Section staffs and performs the Brigade Aerial Observation Program utilizing personnel who

/2

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVBL-C

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

primarily have the MOS 96D (imagery interpreter). These personnel are not school-trained in flight procedures, taking and processing hand-held 35mm still photography, or adjusting artillery fire.

(b) Evaluation.

An intensive program of OJT was established within the detachment to fill the gap between school training in conventional II work and the requirements of the Aerial Observer Program. During this quarter, the 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery, provided a one-week course of instruction on artillery adjustment techniques and procedures that proved to be a highly valuable extension of the detachment training program.

(c) Recommendation.

That artillery training be made a permanent part of the in-country training program for Brigade MID aerial observers.

(2) New Techniques on Rifle Marksmanship.

(a) Observation.

Several new rifle marksmanship techniques were tested under combat and simulated combat conditions during the past reporting period. This study was conducted at the request of the USAIS.

(b) Evaluation.

Comments from all units tested substantiated the following.

1. Semi-automatic fire with the M-16 rifle is much more effective than automatic fire against point, visible, stationary targets in daylight at all ranges. However, automatic fire (three round bursts) is preferred during hours of darkness in night defensive positions.

2. Due to the simplification of training, a consistent center of target aiming point is preferred over the adjusted aiming point for all ranges up to 300 meters.

3. Aimed fire was preferred over pointing fire from ranges greater than 25 meters. Pointing fire is preferred only when employed in a meeting engagement or chance encounter, when there is insufficient time to fire well-aimed shots.

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AVEI-6

21 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

4. The British Alert Position was found to be most desirable only when enemy contact was imminent. The major drawback with this position was found to be the excessive strain on the individual rifleman. The individual soldier carrying a heavy rucksack cannot maintain for long periods a carrying position that requires him to raise one or both arms. Also, since the British Alert Position requires both hands it is virtually impossible to employ this position in dense jungle vegetation in certain areas in Northern I Corps RVN.

5. Of the combat feasible positions, the kneeling supported and kneeling unsupported positions provided the best combination of speed and accuracy. In favorable terrain, the employment of the prone position is still preferred due to the soldier's natural desire to "get low and stay down" when under intense fire.

(c) Recommendation: None

f. Logistics. None

g. Communications: None

h. Material.

Blade Assembly for M-551.

(a) Observation.

Operations in difficult terrain often require the employment of blade tanks or CEV's to make areas accessible to armored vehicles.

(b) Evaluation.

Within the armored cavalry TOE there are no provisions for tactical engineering vehicles, a situation which necessitates their attachment from another unit. Vehicles normally assigned to brigades or divisions do not possess the operational characteristics of the light armored vehicles organic to cavalry units and are not always compatible with cavalry operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVBL-C

21 May 1970


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CFFOR-65 (R2) (1)

(c) Recommendation.

Consideration should be given to the employment of an M-551 AR/AAV with blade assembly on the basis of one per troop. Employment of such a vehicle would significantly increase the operational potential of armored cavalry.

i. Other: None.

6 Incl
as


Wm A. BURKE
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT (21 May 1970) 1st Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RGS CAPOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349 11 JUN 70

TO: Commanding General, USAW, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The OMLL for 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) has been reviewed by
this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the report as written.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Ronald Gray
Ronald Gray
A/C

16

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AVHGC-DST (21 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Mine Ambush", page 8, paragraph b(1): concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Enemy Clothing", page 8, paragraph b(2): concur. Soldiers policing the battlefield often overlook items of enemy clothing which may contain useful information. Unit identification, names, and other pertinent information are often sewn into clothing. The necessity of careful clothing examination should be emphasized to troops in the field and in orientations given replacements. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Sensor Devices", page 9, paragraph c(3): concur. The enemy will habitually return to an area in which recent allied operations have been conducted. Sensor devices should be used to the maximum extent to detect enemy movement in the area once the allied forces have departed. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Illumination", page 10, paragraph c(2): concur. During enemy attacks, especially sapper attacks, constant illumination is necessary. It is equally imperative that illumination be maintained after attack to prevent the enemy from retrieving equipment as well as their dead and wounded. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of Tips for Commanders. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

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
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AVHGC-DST (21 May 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mech), For Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Imagery Interpreter Training", page 12, paragraph e(1): concur. Item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER



Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Colonel
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps
1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)

GPOP-DT (21 May 70) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 1st Infantry Brigade,
5th Infantry Division (Mech) for Period Ending
30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 **11 JUL 70**

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. Cline

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

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Inclosure I (Task Organization) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned
1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 30 April 1970; RCS CSFOk-65
(R2) (U)

1-11 Inf

1-61 Inf (Mech)

TF 1-77 Armor

A/4-12 Cav

TF 3-5 Cav

Bde Control

C/2-34 Armor

HHC, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (M)
5-4 Arty
75th Spt Bn
P/75th Ranger
Bde Security Plt
43rd Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
A/7th Engr
298th Signal Co
407 RRD
517 MID
86th Chem Det
48th PI Det

This task organization reflects the permanent OPCON/attachment relationships within the brigade. Forces are tailored by cross attachment on a mission type basis.


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20

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Inclosure 3 (Operation Green River Overlay: Period 16 April 1970 - Present)
to Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf
Div (Mech), Period Ending 30 April 1970; RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)




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22
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Inclosure 4 (Operation York Market Overlay) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 30 April 1970; RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2). Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L 607, sheet 6442, 1:100,000




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23
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Inclosure 5 (Operation Dakota Clint Overlay) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 30 April 1970; RCS CSFOR -65 (R2). Map, Vietnam, AMS Series L 607, Sheets and 6442, 1:100,000.




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24

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Inclosure 6 (Mine Ambush) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Inf Bde,
5th Inf Div (Mech), Period Ending 30 April 1970; RCS CSFOR - 63 (R2)

Mine Ambush
(Drawing Not to Scale)



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26

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